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Abstract 
We consider two possible explanations-economic anxiety and racial division­
for the appeal of Proposition 209 to California voters during the 1996 election. 
Voter support for this proposition has been attributed to racial differences 
in opinion and to economic anxiety caused by poor economic conditions in 
the state and the perceived threat that affirmative action presented in school 
admissions or the workplace. Because the presidential candidates campaigned 
on and debated the merits of affirmative action policy during this election, 
we incorporate this endogeneity into our analysis. 
We develop two competing hypotheses to explain voter behavior: (1) if 
voters are blaming affirmative action for the state's economic conditions, then 
voters who believe that California's economic condition is poor or who per­
ceive that their personal financial situation is worse will be more likely to 
support Proposition 209; and (2) if voters are, instead, divided along more tra­
ditional racial lines on the merits of affirmative action (winners versus losers) , 
then whites, males, Republicans, and conservatives will be more likely to sup­
port Proposition 209, and other ethnic group members, females, Democrats, 
and liberals will be more likely to oppose Proposition 209. 
To test these hypotheses, we analyze voter exit poll data from the 1996 
California election. We utilize a two-stage logit model to allow for the endo­
geneity of candidate endorsements. We find support for the second of our two 
hypotheses. T hese findings cause us to conclude that racial division fueled 
by a fear of arbitrary exclusion prompted voter support for Proposition 209. 
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The methodological technique we used in this specific case has a broader 
application to other elections and in analysis of the influence of candidate 
endorsements on proposition voting. 
1. Introduction 
During recent years, the debate among the United States citizenry has intensified 
regarding the benefits and costs of affirmative action policy with many individuals 
expressing the belief that opportunities in school admissions and the workplace are being 
afforded to some at the expense of others, resulting in the now commonly heard cry of 
"reverse discrimination." However, at the same time, researchers have been divided as to 
the factors that shape an individual's affirmative action policy opinion. One prominent 
group has argued that what they term "symbolic racism"-a combination of traditional 
American values and antiblack affect-determines white attitudes toward affirmative 
action policies (Kinder and Sears, 1981; Mcconahay, 1986; Kinder, 1986; Kinder and 
Sanders, 1996). Another group has countered by asserting that "symbolic racism" fails as 
an explanation because it confounds policy choice and attitude and ignores the 
continuation of simple and pure antiblack affect as a determinant of white attitudes about 
affirmative action (Sniderman and Hagen, 1985; Sniderman and Tetlock, 1986; 
Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Kuklinski et al., 1997). Still others have found evidence 
that white beliefs about affirmative action contain elements of both these different 
arguments (Alvarez and Brehm, 1997). 
Primarily, these previous studies have relied on opinion surveys to reach their 
conclusions. In this paper, instead, we consider a new method by which to study the 
expression and determinants of affirmative action opinions, namely, the ballot box. We 
focus our analysis on California's experience with affirmative action because this state's 
recent and contentious debate of the issue culminated in the passage of an anti-affirmative 
action initiative. For example, in the 1990s, several lawsuits claiming reverse 
discrimination in undergraduate admissions were filed against the University of 
California after revelations that race was a primary criterion in determining admission to 
several of its campuses (Los Angeles Times, 1995b ). In 1995, the Regents of the 
University of California adopted resolutions to end the university system's preferential 
treatment of disadvantaged ethnic groups in hiring and in school admissions. During the 
following year, the some of the state's residents introduced Proposition 209. 
The purpose of Proposition 209 was to end affirmative action in California's 
government hiring, public school admissions, and public contracting by eliminating 
preferential treatment of any candidate on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin.1 Supporters termed Proposition 209 the California Civil Rights Initiative 
and argued that it would end California's legacy of quotas and morally wrong 
discrimination in hiring, job promotions, and school admissions, and save the state 
hundreds of millions of dollars by eliminating these unfair practices. 
During the 1996 election, the presidential candidates debated the issue of 
affirmative action and offered positions on alternative policies and Proposition 209. This 
proposition was approved by 55 percent of California voters. Two explanations have 
been given for the appeal of this proposition-economic anxiety and racial division. To 
analyze these two competing explanations, we begin by discussing the proposition voting 
literature and the campaign messages and materials. Next, we develop hypotheses about 
how anti-affirmative action attitudes caused by economic anxiety and racial division 
might be reflected in the voting behavior of individuals, and we test these hypotheses 
using Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll data from the November 1996 California 
election. Then, we specify a two-stage logit model which allows for the endogeneity 
caused by the politicization of the issues by the presidential candidates. We conclude 
that racial division fueled by a fear of arbitrary exclusion prompted voter support for 
Proposition 209. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of our findings and the 
general applications of our methods to other related research. 
2. Proposition Voting 
The literature on proposition voting suggests what factors determine an individual's vote 
choices and what information he uses when making those choices (Lupia, 1994). 
Specifically, voting behavior on propositions has been found not to be necessarily or 
consistently a function of voter characteristics such as party identification, education, 
race, income, or region of residence, which are typically significant in candidate choice 
(Magleby, 1984). 
In addition, the information that is available to the voter in a proposition race is 
different in two distinct ways from that which is available in a standard candidate 
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election. First, a brief summary of the initiative appears on the ballot, and additional 
detailed information is provided by the state in the ballot pamphlet. In California, this 
pamphlet summarizes the initiative, presents an impartial analysis of the measure by a 
legislative analyst, and offers arguments for and against it. However, the usefulness of 
this pamphlet is doubtful given its small font, confusing and complicated prose, and 
extensive length. Second, standard election information shortcuts, such as a party 
identification or past experience, on which candidate voting decisions are usually based, 
are typically absent (Downs, 1957; Key, 1966; Fiorina, 198 1 ). Because the election 
literature routinely furnished by the registrar of voters provides too many details and the 
initiative campaigns do not provide adequate information shortcuts, voters may rely 
heavily on media and elite endorsements and on political ideology when appropriate to 
reduce the information costs of voting on propositions (Magleby, 1984; Cronin, 1989; 
Lupia, 1994). 
In this particular election, the voters had access to and relied on both candidate 
and party endorsements to reduce their information costs. Presidential candidates 
campaigned on the issue of affirmative action, staked out opposing positions in their 
speeches, and offered opinions about this California initiative. For example, Pete Wilson, 
California's Republican governor, campaigned primarily on the issue of abolishing 
affirmative action and his support for Proposition 209 during his abortive race for the 
presidency. His short-lived campaign forced the other presidential candidates to confront 
this controversial issue and take a position on it. President Bill Clinton clearly voiced his 
opposition to this initiative and his concerns about ending affirmative action outright 
while the Republican presidential candidate, Bob Dole, openly supported it. Because of 
the endogeneity implied by this relationship (specifically, that an individual's vote on 
Proposition 209 could be influenced or affected by the presidential race), this important 
source of information is controlled for in our analysis. 
In addition, because of the recent and consistent division between the two major 
political parties on this issue, individuals could rely on party identification and political 
ideology reinforced by the presidential candidates' campaigns in their vote choice. Since 
the advent of the national civil rights movement in the early 1960s and Republican Barry 
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Goldwater's unsuccessful 1964 presidential campaign, in which he sought to define racial 
issues as a regional concern and to keep the federal government from interfering with 
local custom, political ideology, party identification, and racial attitudes have been 
inexorably linked. Thus, for thirty years, Democrats have been associated with racial 
liberalism and the advocacy of racial preference policies and affirmative action programs 
while Republicans have been associated with racial conservatism and an opposition to 
such policies and programs (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Gerber and Jackson, 1993). 
In 1996, the parties reaffirmed this division. For example, the Republicans 
explicitly stated their support for Proposition 209 in the 1996 Republican Party Platform: 
"We scorn Bill Clinton's notion that any person should be denied a job, promotion, 
contract or chance at higher education because of their race or gender. Instead, we 
endorse the Dole-Candy Equal Opportunity Act to end discrimination by the federal 
government. We likewise endorse this year's Proposition 209, the California Civil Rights 
Initiative, to restore to law the original meaning of civil rights." The Democrats 
responded by emphasizing their continued support of affirmative action programs which 
met President Clinton's four standards of fairness: "(l) no quotas in theory or in practice; 
(2) no illegal discrimination of any kind, including reverse discrimination; (3) no 
preference for people who are not qualified; and (4) as soon as a program has succeeded, 
it must be retired" (Democratic National Committee, 1997). 
Also, Republican elected officials sent letters to their constituents in support of 
this initiative. For example, Republican California Assemblyman Mickey Conroy, 
representing the 7 lst district and serving as honorary co-chairman of the California Civil 
Rights Initiative, wrote a letter encouraging his constituents to gather signatures and raise 
money in support of this measure (Conroy, 1996). Clearly, during the election campaigns 
of 1996, both parties reiterated their previous positions-and the presidential candidates 
echoed these positions-so that both the parties and their candidates were providing 
voters with information to use in making their decision about Proposition 209. 
The vocabulary used by both the candidates and the parties to describe the 
initiative is also important. The Republicans consistently spoke of it in terms of "racial 
quotas" and "set-aside programs," thereby framing the issue of affirmative action in a 
4 
divisive and negative way intended to increase racial tensions and intensify racial 
differences in opinion on this controversial proposition (Iyengar, 1991; Zaller, 1992). 
The Proposition 209 campaign literature reinforced this message by describing 
affirmative action as an unfair quota system. For example, in a letter to voters, 
Assemblyman Conroy asserted, "Government forced QUOTAS are wrong!" And 
Californians Against Discrimination and Preferences, the primary support group for 
Proposition 209, explained that this initiative was needed "to end the regime of race- and 
sex-based quotas and preferences and set-asides now governing state employment, 
contracting and education." By describing affirmative action in these derogatory terms, 
the initiative's proponents were widening the racial divide on this issue. Specifically, 
whites traditionally have been less supportive of affirmative action programs than blacks 
and other minority groups, and this difference in opinion is accentuated when affirmative 
action programs are portrayed in a negative way or characterized as being about racial 
quotas and set-asides (Steeh and Krysan, 1996). 
Although, the proponents' means, the parties' methods, and the candidates' 
messages suggest that voter support for this initiative may have been divided along 
traditional racial and party lines, reporters and researchers alike have theorized that 
economic anxiety caused the recent backlash against affirmative action and provoked 
voters to support Proposition 209 (Newsweek, 1993; Guerrero, 1997). Therefore, we 
develop two competing hypotheses to explain voter behavior: ( 1) if voters are blaming 
affirmative action for the state's economic conditions, then voters who believe that 
California's economic condition is poor or who perceive that their personal financial 
situation is worse will be more likely to support Proposition 209; and (2) if voters are, 
instead, divided along more traditional racial lines regarding the merits of affirmative 
action (winners versus losers), then whites, males, Republicans, and conservatives will be 
more likely to support Proposition 209, and other ethnic group members, females, 
Democrats, and liberals will be more likely to oppose Proposition 209. 
3. A First Look at the Data 
To test these alternative hypotheses, we analyze Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll data 
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from the 1996 California election by Proposition 209 vote choice and by demographic 
and attitudinal measures (see Tables 1 and 2).2 
Tables 1 and 2 go here 
In Table 1, when race is considered, whites supported Proposition 209 with the 
highest percentage of yes votes (59 percent). The Hispanic and Asian votes were more 
evenly split with 37 percent and 42 percent in favor of the measure, respectively, while 
blacks voted predominantly against, 18 percent for and 82 percent against. At this level 
of analysis, the race of the voter appears to be a reliable predictor of an individual's vote 
for or against the proposition, especially for white and black voters. 
Next, we consider gender. Women were evenly split on the measure, with 49 
percent supporting and 5 1  percent opposing it. However, men were slightly more likely 
to support the measure than women, voting 55 percent in favor and 45 percent against. 
This result suggests that women may not have been viewing themselves as beneficiaries 
of affirmative action programs (Los Angeles Times, 1995a) and that the politicization of 
the proposition by the presidential candidates and the political parties may have led 
women to use party and political ideology cues when casting their votes. 
Then, we consider educational attainment. We find that support for Proposition 
209 was highest among college graduates (56 percent) and less among voters without a 
college degree or with some postbaccalaureate education. For example, high school 
graduates split their votes evenly between supporting and opposing the measure, and 53 
percent of the voters with some graduate education opposed it. 
Finally, in Table 1, we consider the effect of a voter's area of residence. Central 
Valley and Northern California residents voted strongly in favor of the measure (62 
percent for versus 38 percent against). Bay Area residents were predominately against the 
measure (6 1 percent against), and Southern California residents were predominately in 
favor of it (65 percent for). These regional differences in support for Proposition 209 
mirror regional differences in party identification-specifically, that Southern California 
is conservative and Republican and that the Bay Area is traditionally liberal and 
Democratic-and suggest that the politicization of the initiative by the political parties 
and candidates may have divided voters along traditional party lines. Thus, preliminary 
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findings with respect to race and area of residence give some support to the idea that 
voters were being divided along traditional racial and party lines in their response to this 
controversial initiative. 
Turning to Table 2, we find strong support for our hypothesis that economic 
perceptions influenced reaction to Proposition 209. Sixty-six percent of those voters who 
viewed their personal situation as worse voted for the measure. When asked about state 
economic conditions, again those who thought the state was in poor condition voted 
predominately (65 percent) in favor of the measure. Obviously, strong negative opinions 
concerning the state's economy or personal finances strengthened a voter's support for 
Proposition 209. 
When considering the measures of partisanship, ideology, and candidate support 
(see Table 2), we see that 78 percent of Republicans supported the measure while only 31 
percent of Democrats did. Seventy-eight percent of voters who described themselves as 
conservatives favored Proposition 209. Moderates split evenly on the measure with 50 
percent voting for and 50 percent voting against, and Liberals voted solidly against (75 
percent). This result suggests that voters were probably responding to the division 
between the parties on affirmative action and that the candidates were reinforcing this 
division. When the presidential race is considered, 69 percent of those who voted for 
Democrat Incumbent-President Bill Clinton (who campaigned against Proposition 209) 
opposed the measure, while 82 percent of those who supported U.S. Senator Bob Dole, 
the Republican presidential candidate, voted in favor of it. Finally, when Perot voters are 
considered, 67 percent voted in favor of the measure while 33 percent opposed it. These 
preliminary findings support the idea that voters were using information from other 
campaigns to make their vote decision. 
4. A Multivariate Model of Support for Proposition 209 
The data presented in Tables 1 and 2 provide some support for both hypotheses­
economic anxiety and racial division-about why Californians voted for Proposition 209. 
However, it is difficult to discern from these bivariate statistics the relative importance of 
these personal characteristics and attitudes in determining a voter's support for 
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Proposition 209. To make this comparison, we employ a multivariate statistical model. 
Because we are studying why an individual supported or opposed Proposition 209, 
we need a multivariate model which allows for a binary dependent variable. In this case, 
we use a logit model which takes the form: 
Prob(Support Proposition 209) = F(X;p) 
where X; is our matrix of independent variables, p are the coefficients we estimate, and F 
is the logistic function. 
As we asserted earlier, there is reason to believe that support for Proposition 209 
is endogeneous with respect to presidential candidate support. In other words, it is likely 
that voters used candidate campaign messages as cues or information shortcuts when 
deciding how to vote on this initiative (Popkin, 1991; Alvarez and Butterfield, 1998), and 
if we ignore this endogeneity, our coefficient estimates will be biased and our inferences 
incorrect. Therefore, we must develop a multivariate model of presidential candidate 
choice as well, and we must allow for simultaneous relationships between proposition 
and candidate choice. 
In the 1996 presidential election, voters selected among three candidates­
Democratic Incumbent-President Bill Clinton, Republican Bob Dole, and Independent 
Ross Perot-so our analysis requires a multivariate model that allows for a three­
category, unordered dependent variable and does not impose the questionable political 
behavioral assumption of the "independence of irrelevant alternatives" (Alvarez and 
Nagler, 1995, 1997). Therefore, we use a generalized extreme-value model where the 
probability that a voter chooses a particular candidate (where i = 1, 2, or 3 denotes a 
presidential candidate choice, in this case, Dole, Clinton, or Perot) is a function of a set of 
independent variables (Z) and the parameters (G), and the systemic component for each 
candidate choice is Y; = exp<ZG). 
Now, given this model form and assumed distribution, we can write the 
probabilities of selecting each one of the candidates as follows: 
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P1 = Y1 I G(Y1, Y2, Y3) 
P2 = Y2110-crl (Y2110-crJ + Y3110-crl )O-crl I G(Y1, Y2, Y3) 
P3 = Y311
0-crl (Y21'0-crl + Y3ItO-crJ )O-crl I G(Y1, Y2, Y3) 
where G(Y1, Y2, Y3) = Y1 + (Y21/(1-cr) + y3lt(l-cr)
 )(1-cr) 
Given these models of proposition and presidential candidate voting and our 
expectations about endogeneity, we suppose that a voter's predisposition to support 
Proposition 209 is a function of a set of independent variables and the predisposition to 
support a presidential candidate and that a voter's predisposition to support a presidential 
candidate is a function of other independent variables and the predisposition to support 
Proposition 209. Now, given this functional form, we can follow a simple two-stage 
estimation procedure which closely resembles that in previous research except that our 
models assume a logistic distribution instead of a normal distribution so we estimate a 
two-stage logit instead of a two-stage probit (Alvarez, 1997; Alvarez and Butterfield, 
1998). 
The two-stage estimation procedure is as follows. We begin by writing the 
reduced-form equations for Proposition 209 support and for presidential candidate 
support using all of the exogeneous variables in the model. We estimate these equations 
using logit and generalized extreme-value model specifications, respectively. From the 
reduced-form estimates, we produce predicted values for the three underlying voter 
predispositions (propensity to support Proposition 209, to support Clinton or Dole, and 
to support Perot or Dole).3 Next, we substitute these predicted values for the right-hand­
side endogeneous variables, and then we estimate the models for Proposition 209 support 
and for presidential candidate support. 
In addition, this specification and estimation procedure provides us with an 
obvious and reliable statistical test for endogeneity. Specifically, if we consider our 
models that correct for endogeneity as our unrestricted models and then we estimate 
restricted models that do not correct for endogeneity (excluding the calculated 
instruments, the propensity to support Proposition 209, and the propensity to support a 
presidential candidate), then the ratio of the log-likelihoods from each set of estimations 
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gives us a statistical test for the assumed endogeneity. This test has a chi-square 
distribution, with the number of degrees of freedom being the number of restrictions 
imposed. We use this method to test our assumption of endogeneity. 
Given this estimation procedure for the model, we now consider the model 
specification. We discuss how we specify the independent variables for the Proposition 
209 model below. In the appendix, we discuss the reduced-form estimates (see Tables 5 
and 6) and how we specify the presidential candidate voting model (see Table 4). 
In our specification of voting for Proposition 209, we include political ideology, 
political party affiliation, state economic and personal financial perceptions, and several 
socioeconomic variables. Political party affiliation and political ideology were included 
to measure these influences on the vote and to see if the vote on Proposition 209 was 
divided by party and political ideology as hypothesized. Both of these variables were 
included as two binary variables, Republican and Democrat for political party affiliation 
and Liberal and Conservative for political ideology with Independent and Other Party 
being the excluded categories for party affiliation and Moderate being the excluded 
category for political ideology. Race is included to enable us to test the way in which 
different racial groups responded to Proposition 209. 
Next, the voter's assessments of the change in her personal finances from one year 
ago and the condition of the state's economy were included to measure the influence of 
economic evaluation on her vote and to test the economic anxiety hypothesis. These 
variables were coded with l -to-3 and 1-to-4 scales, with I denoting worse or poor, 
respectively. 
Race consists of three binary variables: white, Hispanic, and Asian. The black 
category was excluded. In addition, a gender variable was included to see if more 
women favored the measure as suggested by the racial division hypothesis. This variable 
is a binary variable with I denoting a female voter. 
Respondent education level was included and was coded with a 1-to-5 scale 
assuming a linear relationship with 1 denoting less than a high school education and 5 
denoting postcollege education.4 To allow for possible regional effects on voter choice, 
binary variables were included for four of the five major regions that the survey included, 
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Los Angeles City, Los Angeles Suburbs, Other Southern California, and Central Valley 
and Northern California. The Bay Area was the region excluded. Also, the instruments 
calculated for an individual's presidential vote were included. 
Given this estimation technique and model specification, the two possible 
explanations for support for Proposition 209-economic anxiety and racial division-can 
be tested. In the next section, we present the estimated results of this model specification. 
5. Determinants of Support for Proposition 209 
5.1 Two-stage logit results 
The two-stage logit results are presented in Table 3. The following discussion of the 
coefficient estimates is brief, given the difficulty inherent in attempting to interpret these 
coefficients, particularly the inability to compare the relative influence of the coefficients 
on a voter's choice. For these reasons, our discussion emphasizes the statistically 
significant coefficients and the preliminary implications of these results for the proposed 
explanations for the appeal of Proposition 209 to California voters. Next, we present a 
more thorough discussion in which a hypothetical voter is selected allowing probabilities 
to be computed, and then we compare the relative magnitude of voter characteristics and 
attitudes on Proposition 209 voting. 
Table 3 goes here 
First, when the two-stage logit coefficients are considered, there is support for our 
theory of the politicization of the issue of affirmative action by the candidates. The 
Clinton variable is statistically significant and negative indicating that an individual who 
voted for Clinton was more likely to vote against Proposition 209 than an individual who 
voted for Dole. Also, the endogeneity test is significant. Both of these results suggest 
that voters were using the presidential candidate endorsements to determine their position 
on this initiative. 
Now, we consider the other significant coefficients in the two-stage logit model. 
The Democratic Party identification and the political ideology coefficients are significant. 
If a voter identified with the Democratic Party or considered herself liberal in political 
matters, she was significantly more likely to oppose Proposition 209. If she considered 
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herself conservative in political matters, she was significantly more likely to support 
Proposition 209. These preliminary findings suggest that voters were using the parties' 
positions in making their vote choice and that voters were being divided along traditional 
party and ideological lines. 
The voter's perception of the state's economy is statistically significant, and that 
of her personal finances is not. However, it is important to note that the state economy 
coefficient is not negative. Instead, it is positive. This result means that, as an 
individual's view of the economy improves from poor to excellent, she is more likely to 
support the initiative. These results are opposite that of the economic anxiety hypothesis, 
which states that a voter will support Proposition 209 if she believes the state's economic 
conditions are poor or if she perceives her personal financial situation is worse. 
Next, when we consider the race coefficients, we find that whites are significantly 
more likely to support the measure than other racial groups. This finding suggests that 
voters were being divided by the politicization of the issue by the parties along traditional 
racial lines and that the campaign messages, which emphasized "quotas" and "set-asides," 
may have mobilized white support for the measure. 
The gender coefficient is not significant. Although gender was predicted to be 
significant because women can be the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs, this 
result suggests that women may not have viewed themselves as recipients of these 
benefits, and the politicization of the proposition by the presidential candidates and the 
political parties may have led women to use party and political ideology cues when 
casting their votes. 
Finally, when the education and region of residence coefficients are considered, 
we find that the education coefficient is not significant, and the other Southern California 
and Central Valley or Northern California coefficients are significant. These regional 
differences in support mirror the regional differences in party identification and further 
suggest that politicization of the issue of affirmative action by the candidates was 
dividing California's residents along party lines. 
These findings with respect to party identification, political ideology, economic 
perceptions, race, and area of residence support the racial division hypothesis rather than 
12 
the economic anxiety hypothesis. 
5.2 Relative magnitudes of the estimated effects 
To better understand the degrees to which these different variables influence a voter's 
probability of supporting Proposition 209, we first define a hypothetical voter. This 
hypothetical voter is a white, female, Central Valley or Northern California resident with 
an average education (some college but no degree). She thinks her family's financial 
situation is the same as it was a year ago and that the state's economy is good. In 
addition, she considers herself a Democrat and, in most political matters, a moderate.5 
Now, using these fixed voter opinions and characteristics, we can calculate 
probabilities that show the effect of changing one independent variable at a time on the 
probability of supporting the measure (see Figures 1-5). This technique allows us to test 
our hypotheses of racial division and economic anxiety. 
If we change the hypothetical voter's race, the results are convincing evidence for 
the racial division hypothesis (see Figure 1 ). For example, if the hypothetical voter's race 
is changed from white to black, Asian, or Hispanic, ceteris paribus, she will change from 
a supporter to an opponent of the measure. Her probability of supporting the measure 
decreases from 60 percent to 43 percent if she is black, to 40 percent if she is Asian, and 
to 44 percent if she is Hispanic. This result strongly suggests that supporters and 
opponents of Proposition 209 were divided by race and according to whether they 
perceived themselves to have gained or lost ground as a result of affirmative action 
programs. 
Figure 1 goes here 
Next, we consider the effect of the voter's economic perceptions on Proposition 
209 voting (see Figure 2). The first-difference calculations confirm the previous results 
that a voter's economic perceptions of the state's economy did influence her vote 
decision, but her perceptions of her own personal financial situation did not. Again, as 
the positive significant coefficient suggested, when an individual's view of the economy 
improved from poor to excellent, she was more likely to support the initiative (48 percent 
versus 65 percent). There was no significant change in her level of support if she 
perceived her own financial situation to be worse instead of better (62 percent versus 57 
13 
percent). She still supported the measure. These results contradict the economic anxiety 
hypothesis, which states that a voter will support Proposition 209 if she believes the 
state's economic conditions are poor or if she perceives her personal financial situation is 
worse. 
(Figure 2 goes here) 
Then, we consider the effects of political ideology and political party affiliation on 
the hypothetical voter's probability of supporting Proposition 209 (see Figures 3 and 4). 
Changing her political ideology from moderate to conservative increases her propensity to 
support the measure from 60 percent to 68 percent. However, changing her political 
ideology from moderate to liberal decreases her probability by 20 percent (60 percent 
versus 40 percent), changing her from a supporter of the measure to an opponent of it. 
When the hypothetical voter's party affiliation is changed from Democrat to Republican, 
ceteris paribus, her probability of supporting the proposition increases dramatically from 
60 percent to 73 percent. Although, party affiliation alone could not change a supporter 
into an opponent of the measure, clearly it was an important factor in a voter's decision 
regarding Proposition 209. 
(Figures 3 and 4 go here) 
These results indicate that a voter's race, political party affiliation, and political 
ideology were all important factors, as assumed by the racial division hypothesis. In 
addition, a voter's perception of the state's economy and personal financial situation did 
not influence a voter's decision in the way assumed by the economic anxiety hypothesis. 
These results strongly support the racial division hypothesis that the campaign, its 
rhetoric, the parties, and the candidates framed the issue in exclusionary terms and 
successfully divided the electorate along racial and party lines, and between winners and 
losers in affirmative action programs. 
5.3 How important was presidential candidate choice? 
To verify the influence of presidential candidate endorsements on a voter's decision 
making, we varied the hypothetical voter's probability of supporting Clinton relative to 
Dole and of supporting Perot relative to Dole and predicted her probability of supporting 
Proposition 209 (see Figure 5). The results strongly suggest that an individual who was 
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more likely to support Clinton relative to Dole would oppose the proposition while an 
individual who was more likely to support Perot relative to Dole would support the 
measure. Specifically, as we increase the hypothetical voter's likelihood of voting for 
Clinton relative to Dole, her probability of supporting Proposition 209 decreases from 98 
percent to 17 percent. Likewise, as we increase an individual's probability of supporting 
Perot relative to Dole, the probability of supporting the measure increases from 11 
percent to 92 percent. These results suggest that the politicization of affirmative action 
by the presidential candidates did sway the vote on Proposition 209. 
(Figure 5 goes here) 
6. Conclusions and Discussion 
Our analysis of the exit poll data supports the second of the two competing explanations, 
racial division, for Proposition 209's appeal to California voters. Because of the 
politicization of Proposition 209 by the presidential candidates and the recent and 
consistent positions of the two major political parties on the issue of affirmative action, 
the voters were systematically divided by political party affiliation, political ideology, and 
race in their support for or opposition to this initiative. 
The racial division hypothesis assumed that race, gender, political party 
affiliation, and political ideology would be important factors in a voter's support of 
Proposition 209. With respect to race, we found that whites, who potentially are the 
affirmative action losers, were more likely to support the measure than members of other 
ethnic or racial groups, who are typically seen as affirmative action winners. Second, we 
found that gender was not a significant factor in vote decision. Although this result was 
somewhat surprising, we attributed it to the fact that women may not view themselves as 
beneficiaries of affirmative action programs and that the issue was politicized by the 
presidential candidates and their political parties. Third, political party affiliation and 
political ideology were both shown to be significant and important factors in an 
individual's vote choice. Simply, by changing the hypothetical voter's political ideology, 
we could transform a supporter into an opponent of the measure. Clearly, race, political 
party affiliation, and political ideology were all important factors in determining support 
for Proposition 209. 
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In addition, when we considered the effects of area of residence and presidential 
vote choice, we found secondary support for the racial division hypothesis. Specifically, 
the regional differences in support for the measure correspond to the regional differences 
in party identification, with residents of the heavily Republican region (Southern 
California) supporting the measure and residents of the heavily Democratic region (Bay 
Area) opposing the measure. Also, when we focused our analysis on presidential 
candidate choice to determine its effects on a voter's initiative decision, we found that 
there was a strong relationship between candidate choice and proposition vote. The 
results suggest that an individual who was more likely to support Clinton relative to Dole 
would oppose the proposition. These results give additional support to the theory that the 
politicization of affirmative action by the presidential candidates did influence the vote on 
Proposition 209. 
Although Proposition 209 may have had no immediate public policy impact since 
it immediately was challenged in court, it may have long-term implications for politics in 
California and throughout the nation. The Republican Party's open support for both 
Proposition 187 and 209 has caused ethnic minority and women voters to question this 
party's goals and has motivated some new citizens to register as Democrats instead of as 
Republicans (Los Angeles Times, 1995c). As the two major political parties compete for 
both minority and women voters in the presidential election of 2000, it will be interesting 
to see how each party reinvents itself to attract and keep these voters. 
In addition to finding an explanation for voter support for Proposition 209, the 
larger contribution of this work is its methodology, namely, how candidate elections can 
affect proposition voting and how to model this important source of endogeneity. Our 
results show that failing to control for the effect of campaign rhetoric can cause the 
researcher to make inappropriate assumptions and inaccurate inferences. The 
politicization of initiative campaigns in California and in other states (two recent 
examples in California are Proposition 187, the anti-immigrant initiative, in 1994 and 
Proposition 209, the anti-affirmative action initiative, in 1996) by vote-seeking politicians 
is a phenomenon of contemporary politics which cannot be ignored in future studies of 
initiative voting and must be incorporated into empirical research. 
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Appendix 
Specification of the Presidential Model 
To specify the presidential model, we include the voter characteristic and opinion 
variables used in the Proposition 209 model (see Section 4): race, gender, educational 
attainment, area of residence, opinion of California's economic condition, opinion of 
personal financial situation, political ideology, and political party affiliation. In addition, 
because the presidential candidates politicized the issue of affirmative action, a voter's 
propensity to support Proposition 209 is also included in the model. Finally, we also 
included the relevant presidential issue variables. The survey asked each voter which 
issue from a list of nine mattered most in his vote for President. The issues were taxes, 
medicare/social security, foreign policy, federal budget, economy/jobs, education, and 
crime/drugs. In the model, we excluded the issues of foreign policy and economy/jobs 
because of the low selection rate and concern about multicollinearity, respectively. We 
coded identically all of the issue variables as binary variables. If a voter marked an issue 
as important in his vote choice, then the issue was coded as a 1 for the voter; otherwise, 
the issue was coded 0 for the voter. The estimated results of this model are presented in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 goes here 
When we consider the results of the presidential model, Table 4, we find that the 
political ideology and political party affiliation coefficients are primarily significant and 
appropriately signed. For example, when the coefficients of Clinton relative to Dole are 
considered, both party affiliation coefficients are significant and the Democratic 
coefficient has a positive sign, meaning that Democrats were more likely to support 
Clinton than they were to support Dole, and the Republican coefficient has a negative 
sign, meaning the Republicans were more likely to support Dole than they were to 
support Clinton. In addition, the Conservative political ideology coefficient is significant 
and has a negative sign, meaning that individuals who consider themselves conservative 
in political matters are more likely to support Dole than Clinton. Next, when the 
coefficients of Perot relative to Dole are considered, the only significant political 
affiliation or political ideology coefficient is the Republican coefficient, implying that 
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Republicans were more likely to support Dole than Perot. These results are consistent 
with voting theory that voters use shortcuts, such as party identification and ideology, in 
partisan races to help make candidate choices (Popkin, 1991 ). 
When the issues that were important to the voter in his presidential candidate 
choice are considered (taxes, medicare/social security, and federal budget deficit), they 
correspond to the election issues (cutting taxes, welfare reform, and balancing the federal 
budget). The voter's opinion concerning California's economy is significant, and his 
perception of personal finances is not, which is consistent with the fact that individuals 
usually do not vote their pocketbooks. 
Next, when we consider the socioeconomic variables (race, educational 
attainment, and area of residence), we find that Asians were significantly more likely to 
support Dole relative to either Perot or Clinton, and Hispanics were more likely to 
support Dole relative to Clinton. Also, women were no more likely to support one 
candidate than another. The educational coefficients are both significant and negatively 
signed, signifying that, as an individual's educational attainment increased, he was more 
likely to support Dole than either Clinton or Perot. None of the regional variables are 
significant, implying that, in this election, presidential candidate choice was independent 
of a voter's area of residence. 
Finally, an individual's vote on Proposition 209 was not significant in determining 
a voter's presidential candidate choice, once we control for all of these other influences 
on candidate choice. Also, the endogeneity test here is not significant. Thus, an 
individual's presidential candidate choice did influence his vote on Proposition 209, but 
his vote on this proposition did not influence his candidate choice. This finding suggests 
voters were relying on the presidential candidates to guide them in their vote choices 
regarding Proposition 209 but did not consider the proposition a national issue and, 
therefore, were not basing their presidential candidate choice on this issue. The last 
coefficient estimate in Table 4 is cr, the inclusive value. This coefficient provides a test 
for the appropriateness of the IIA assumption. The value of cr should fall within the unit 
interval. When this value falls outside this interval, there is a model specification 
problem. In this case, cr lies within the unit interval, indicating that the model is specified 
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correctly and verifying that the IlA assumption does not hold. 
The Reduced-Form Estimates 
The reduced-form estimates are presented in Tables 5 and 6. As discussed in Section 4, 
the reduced-form estimates permit us to calculate the instrumental variables for the right­
hand-side endogeneous variables-the predisposition to support Proposition 209, the 
predisposition to support Clinton relative to Dole, and the predisposition to support Perot 
relative to Dole. The reduced-form equations must include all of the exogeneous 
variables in both the proposition and presidential voting models. Therefore, in addition to 
the voter characteristic and attitudinal variables of race, gender, educational attainment, 
area of residence, opinion of California's economic condition, opinion of personal 
financial situation, political ideology, and political party affiliation (for a thorough 
discussion of these variables and how they were coded, see Section 4 of the paper), we 
also included the relevant presidential issue variables discussed in the specification of the 
presidential voting model (see discussion above). Next, using these estimated 
coefficients, we imputed the propensities for each voter to support the initiative and 
Clinton relative to Dole and Perot relative to Dole. Finally, using these calculated values, 
we estimated the specified Proposition 209 and presidential voting models. 
Tables 5 and 6 go here 
1 On April 8, 1997, in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, the Ninth Circuit United 
States Court of Appeals held that Proposition 209 was constitutionally valid under both 
the equal protection and supremacy clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The United States 
Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. 
2 The Voter News Service (VNS) exit poll was part of the nationwide survey effort 
conducted by the VNS (a consortium of national media and public opinion polling 
organizations) in which 3,282 registered voters leaving polling booths in California were 
asked to respond to a short questionnaire. Unfortunately, the question asking the voter 
how he voted on Proposition 209 was placed on the backside of the questionnaire 
resulting in a considerable number of nonresponses. Only 1,597 of the 3,282 registered 
voters surveyed answered this particular question. These data were obtained from the 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). 
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3These presidential candidate comparisons arise from the normalization we use to 
estimate the candidate model. We normalized by Dole. We used this particular 
normalization because we wanted to know the voter's propensity to support the two 
candidates who voiced clear and contrasting opinions on the issue of affirmative action 
and Proposition 209, Clinton and Dole. 
4Although this linear assumption is common for education variables, its appropriateness 
can be questioned; however, in this case, it seemed better to have one variable to measure 
this effect versus four binary variables. 
5 Formulating a hypothetical voter when a model contains so many variables that cannot 
be easily averaged, such as party affiliation, is a difficult task because there is no correct 
method or rule to apply. The following logic was used in formulating this hypothetical 
voter. This particular voter seemed to best represent the exit poll sample. For example, 
more whites voted than any other racial group. More women voted than men. There 
were more voters from the Central Valley/Northern California than from the other 
regions. Women were on average affiliated with the Democratic Party, and the 
hypothetical voter was given the most prevalent political ideology of Moderate. In 
addition, she was given the most common economic perceptions of all the voters 
surveyed. 
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Table 1: Demographics of Support for Proposition 209 
Support Opposition 
Total sample 52.1 47.9 
832 765 
Whites 59.3 40.8 
666 458 
African-Americans 18.2 81.8 
24 108 
Hispanics 37.4 62.6 
80 134 
Asian-Americans 42.0 58.0 
34 47 
Women 49.2 50.8 
406 419 
Men 55.2 44.8 
426 346 
No High School 41.9 58.l 
26 36 
High School 49.6 50.4 
117 119 
Some College 54.4 45.6 
271 227 
College Graduate 56.1 43.9 
252 197 
Post-College 47.2 52.8 
166 186 
Central Valley 61.5 38.5 
and North 264 165 
Bay Area 39.3 60.7 
222 343 
Southern CA 64.5 35.5 
225 124 
LA County 57.1 42.9 
36 27 
LA City 44.5 55.5 
85 1 06 
Table 2: Political and Economic Aspects of Support for Proposition 209 
Support Opposition 
Clinton voters 31.2 68.8 
283 623 
Dole voters 81. 7 18.3 
478 107 
Perot voters 67.0 33.0 
71 25 
Democrats 30.5 69.5 
222 507 
Independents 55. 7 44.3 
167 133 
Republicans 78.0 22.0 
Liberals 
Moderates 
Conservatives 
Finances Better 
Finances Same 
Finances Worse 
Economy Excellent 
Economy Good 
Economy Not Good 
Economy Poor 
433 122 
24.8 75.2 
98 297 
50.0 50.0 
359 359 
78.4 21.7 
362 100 
44.3 55.7 
266 334 
52.2 47.8 
344 315 
65.7 34.3 
222 116 
59.5 40.5 
46 32 
47.9 52.1 
373 406 
53.8 46.2 
329 283 
65.4 34.7 
83 44 
Table 3: Voting for Proposition 209 
Logit Two-stage logit 
Constant -.38 -.28 
.38 .59 
Democrats -.80** -.40* 
.15 .25 
Republicans .56** .19 
.17 .31 
Liberals - .84** -.78** 
.15 .21 
Conservatives .78** .37** 
. 15 .22 
State economy .12* .24** 
.09 .12 
Personal finances -.23** -.10 
.08 .10 
W hites .99** .69** 
.20 .28 
Asian-Americans .009 -.11 
.32 .49 
Hispanics .30 .07 
.25 .27 
Women -.10 -.02 
.12 .12 
Education -.01 - .00 
.12 .06 
LA City .22 .21 
.20 .23 
LA County .11 .07 
.31 .32 
Southern CA .37** .30* 
.16 .19 
Central and Northern .35** .32** 
.15 .19 
Clinton v. Dole - .66** 
.36 
Perot v. Dole .56 
.48 
Sample N 1597 1597 
x2 456.1 ** 463.61 ** 
percent correct 73.9 73.5 
Endogeneity test 7.48(2)t 
Note: * indicates significance at the p=.10 level (one tailed test for 
the model coefficients) and ** indicates significance at the p=.05 
level (one tailed test for the model coefficients).  t indicates a x2 
test which is significant at the p=.05 level for the given degrees of 
freedom. 
Table 4: Presidential Voting in California 
Perot v. Dole Clinton v .  Dole 
Constant 1 .8** 1 .8** 
.74 .76 
Democrats .76 1 . 1  ** 
.70 .56 
Republicans 
Liberals 
Conservatives 
Taxes 
Medicare and 
Social Sec. 
Federal Deficit 
Economy and Jobs 
Crime and Drugs 
State economy 
Personal finances 
Whites 
Asian-Americans 
Hispanics 
Women 
Education 
LA City 
LA County 
Southern CA 
Central and Northern 
Prop. 209 
(J 
-1.2** 
.43 
.19 
.63 
-.33 
.67 
-.53 
.48 
.60** 
.30 
-.51 
.42 
-.47 
.59 
-.23 
.43 
.04 
.23 
- .00 
.24 
-.42 
.84 
-1.8** 
.57 
-.42 
.55 
-.06 
.21 
-.14* 
.08 
-.32 
.35 
.15 
.39 
-.26 
.34 
-.33 
.34 
-.75 
.73 
.72** 
.34 
Endogeneity test -1.25(2) 
Sample N 1597 
-1.4** 
.39 
.17 
.59 
-.78* 
.59 
-.98** 
.36 
.56** 
.29 
-.80** 
.36 
-.27 
.50 
-.15 
.41  
.24* 
.16 
. 15 
.20 
-.66 
.80 
-1 .6** 
.52 
-.65* 
.52 
.05 
.18 
- .12** 
.08 
-.28 
.33 
. 1 7  
.37 
-.29 
.32 
-.31 
.32 
-.73 
.68 
Note: * indicates significance at the p=.10 level (one tailed test for 
the model coefficients) and ** indicates significance at the p=.05 
level (one tailed test for the model coefficients). t indicates a x2 
test which is significant at the p=.05 level for the given degrees of 
freedom. 
Table 5: Reduced Form Equations for Proposition 209 Voting 
Proposition 209 support 
Constant - . 36 
.40 
Democrats - .77 
.15 
Republicans .46 
.17 
Liberals - .78 
.15 
Conservatives .78 
.16 
Taxes .30 
.18 
Medicare and .006 
Social Security .19 
Federal Deficit .20 
.22 
Crime and Drugs -.53 
.20 
Economy and Jobs .47 
.24 
State economy .11 
.09 
Personal finance - .20 
.08 
W hites .97 
.21 
Asians .01 
.32 
Hispanics .29 
.25 
Women -.10 
.12 
Education .02 
.06 
LA City .16 
.21 
LA County .02 
.32 
Southern CA .32 
.17 
Central and Northern .34 
.16 
Table 6: Reduced Form Equations for Presidential Voting 
Clinton v. Dole Perot v. Dole 
Constant 2.1 2.2 
.68 .65 
Democrats 1. 7 1.3 
.24 .43 
Republicans -1.7 -1.5 
.21 .26 
Liberals .74 .78 
.25 .26 
Conservatives -1.4 -.91 
.27 .39 
Taxes -1.2 -.73 
.29 .43 
Medicare and .54 .57 
Social Security .29 .30 
Federal Deficit -.95 -.66 
.33 .39 
Crime and Drugs .12 -.07 
.32 .44 
Economy and Jobs -.48 -.58 
.29 .31 
State economy .16 -.06 
.14 .21 
Personal finance .31 .15 
.13 .18 
Whites -1.4 -1.1 
.43 .45 
Asians -1.6 -1.8 
.53 .58 
Hispanics -.87 -.63 
.47 .51 
Women .10 -.02 
.18 .21 
Education -.13 -.14 
.07 .09 
LA City -.42 -.47 
.31 .33 
LA County .13 .11 
.37 .39 
Southern CA -.54 -.52 
.23 .24 
Central and Northern -.55 -.58 
.22 .23 
(]" .71 
.34 
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